Published: 18 November 2019
Last updated: 4 March 2024
Even now, it seems that a third election campaign at the beginning of 2020 is a realistic possibility.
Many in the Israeli political system and public claim that the current political crisis is largely due to the complex nature of the Israeli electoral system. The argument holds that the Israeli voting method does not seek to introduce a decisive result, but is largely based on the ability and skills of a given candidate to form a coalition of enough Knesset members.
This argument is inaccurate. Throughout its existence, Israel has not suffered an unusual political instability, certainly not in comparison with other parliamentary democracies such as Italy and Spain. Therefore, in many ways the problem we are now facing is not a constitutional problem, but rather a political and, above all, a legal one: the suspicions of corruption against Benjamin Netanyahu, which cause many players in the political field to regard him as an illegitimate partner to form a government.
In historical terms, the Israeli electoral system has been characterised over the years (and at least until recently) by a very low electoral threshold, which allowed small, sectoral parties to win seats in the Knesset, and to a large extent, to determine its agenda. Sometimes these parties dictated the formation or overthrow of governments.
In short, the Israeli electoral system has favoured the value of representation over the value of political stability. Why?
In the period before (and shortly after) the establishment of the State of Israel, the Zionist movement sought to bring groups which were hostile towards the Zionist idea, closer to the concept of an independent Jewish state. Therefore, it was highly important that parties such as Agudat Yisrael, representing the ultra-Orthodox public, would join coalitions and play an active role in national politics. In other words, the rationale behind a low electoral threshold, and a disproportionate representation of minority groups, was essentially the attempt to strengthen the Zionist project.
In short, the Israeli electoral system has favoured the value of representation over the value of political stability. Why?
As a result, even when the Labor Party was strong and dominant enough to almost form governments on its own, it preferred to include sectoral parties in its governments, although it sometimes meant painful compromises in crucial subjects such as state-religion relations and foreign policy. In the 1969 elections, for example, the Labor Party led by Golda Meir, won 56 out of 120 seats in the Knesset.
That is, it needed no more than one other small partner to reach a coalition of 61 MKs. Nevertheless, Meir preferred to include in her coalition no less than six other parties and formed the largest coalition in Israel's history: 102 MKs. Again, the value of representation overcomes the value of stability. Prime ministers are ready to reconcile demands of different parties, sometimes representing opposite agendas, and jeopardise their governments' stability, in exchange for a national unity under the Zionist ideology.
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The same political DNA still exists, in part (and despite the latest increase of the electoral threshold) today. In principle, Benny Gantz can pretty easily form a narrow left-wing government that relies on the Arab parties. With an abstention or support of Yisrael Beiteinu led by Avigdor Lieberman, such a government could have gained a confidence of between 57 to 65 MKs, and in any case, it could have held a majority compared to the 55-seat right-wing bloc.
In any other democracy, this would have been the most probable scenario. Imagine a situation where a candidate holds a majority in parliament - but they choose to give up that majority and join their political rivals instead. Absurd!
However, the traditional Israeli viewpoint which argues that broad governments should be formed (to represent most sectors in society) is still deeply rooted. This, of course, is in addition to a prominent position that sees the Arab parties as less legitimate in forming a coalition, at least on the right side of the political map.
Prime ministers are ready to reconcile demands of different parties, sometimes representing opposite agendas, and jeopardise their governments' stability, in exchange for a national unity under the Zionist ideology.
Another proposal that emerged in recent weeks was that the 22nd Knesset would make legislative changes that would lead to direct elections for prime minister, with Gantz and Netanyahu as main candidates). This proposal actually seeks to revert to the disastrous electoral system introduced in Israel in 1996-2001, in which voters chose through two ballots: a party ballot and a prime ministerial ballot.
The system of direct elections for prime minister was a catastrophe. First, it strengthened small partie, and gave them even more power. Voters saw the party ballot as a more concrete and effective expression of their ideology, and therefore avoided voting for the more "mainstream", centrist parties (back then, Likud and Labor). Second, and consequently, elected prime ministers could not form a stable coalition and hold it for long. Ruling parties became smaller, and sectoral parties were sometimes less willing to cooperate with them.
The exact same problem can arise today in case of direct elections between Gantz and Netanyahu. Neither of the two candidates holds a majority in the 22nd Knesset, so even if one of them will be elected through a direct process, there is no guarantee that this will be reflected in the formation of a new government. A possible inability to execute voters' will through the political constellation indicates the great distortion of the direct prime ministerial voting system.
Finally, there is also a moral dilemma: An attempt to provide a strategic, constitutional solution to a problem stemming from the personal/legal status of a single political persona (Benjamin Netanyahu) is clearly unethical.
